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 This paper is a first empirical foray in the debate concerning mandatory bilingualism for 
Supreme Court judges in Canada. The paper summarizes the main arguments, discusses the 
framing of bilingualism as a “legal” or an “identity” requirement, and uses empirical data to 
assess whether unilingualism has had an impact on four dimensions of the decision-making 
process at the Supreme Court of Canada: panel composition, assertiveness, individual 
caseloads and deference towards lower courts by unilingual and bilingual judges. Our results 
suggest that there is a correlation between the fluency in French and the first three elements 
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research, the general picture that emerges is that language proficiency superimposes itself 
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[An] objection to this scheme is that two languages are to be used. One-half of 
the members will get up and jabber in French, and not one of our members will 
understand what they are saying. The courts of law are conducted in French too. In 
Lower Canada one lawyer talks to the jury in French and another in English. This is 
a system with which we want nothing to do.
  William Needham, 3 April 1866, House of Assembly of New Brunswick, 
St John.1
MULTILINGUALISM POSES MANY CHALLENGES to national and supra-national 
political and legal institutions, whether it comes from possible misunderstandings, 
settling on the authoritative version of a text or the organization of work. 
Even in the face of the emergence of English as a lingua franca, national and 
sub-national languages will continue, in all likelihood, to play an important 
role in the functioning of political and legal institutions. The situation in 
Canada provides a rich fodder to start thinking about the specific challenges of 
institutional multilingualism because, as the opening quotation reminds us, the 
country has dealt with the question of institutional bilingualism since its very 
beginnings. The respective place of French and English in public institutions—
from parliamentary debates to legal texts, from public education to judicial 
proceedings—has been a periodic matter of contention.2 Notwithstanding this 
situation, Canadian scholarship has surprisingly little to offer in terms of positive 
1. Janet Ajzenstat et al, eds, Canada’s Founding Debates (Toronto: Stoddart 
Publishing, 1999) at 329.
2. For a brief history, see André Braën, “Language Rights” in Michel Bastarache, ed, Language 
Rights in Canada (Montréal: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1987) at 3.
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evidence regarding the impact of unilingualism and bilingualism on public 
institutions and, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical evidence regarding 
its impact on judicial behaviour.3
This lack of comprehensive empirical evidence about the behavioural impact 
of institutional multilingualism is not distinctly Canadian; it is a feature of the 
judicial politics and comparative constitutional studies in general.4 It seems 
that the question of the interaction of law and languages has garnered more 
interest from sociolinguists and anthropologists than legal scholars.5 To be fair, 
the specific issue of judicial bilingualism might not be as politically salient in 
other multilingual jurisdiction as it is in Canada; the institutional design of 
the Supreme Court of Canada is perhaps unique in providing both for official 
institutional bilingualism while also allowing some cases to be heard by judges 
who do not understand the official language of the parties.
In Belgium, for example, each chamber of the Cour de Cassation is subdivided 
into French and Flemish sections of five judges each and the cases are argued in 
3. There have been numerous normative debates on language rights and institutional 
multilingualism both in Canada and elsewhere. See e.g. Will Kymlicka & Alan Patten, eds, 
Language Rights and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). See also Philip 
Van Parijs, Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011); David Robichaud, “Cooperative justice and English as a lingua franca: the tension 
between optimism and Anglophones free riding” (2015) 18 Crit Rev Intl Soc & Pol Phil 
164. From a constitutional design perspective, see Sujit Choudhry, “Managing linguistic 
nationalism through constitutional design: Lessons from South Asia” (2009) 7 Intl J Constl L 
577. See also the special issue of the King’s Law Journal dedicated to this topic. Special Issue: 
Translinguistic Law: Law and Language in Transnational Spaces (2014) 25 King’s LJ 137.
4. Sujit Chouhdry complains that “despite their salience, these issues have attracted relatively 
minimal attention in the literature on both comparative constitutional law and constitutional 
design.” See Choudhry, supra note 3 at 578.
5. There is considerable empirical and ethnographic literature on multilingualism in the 
courtroom, especially in the United States. See e.g. Diana Eades, “Participation of Second 
Language and Second Dialect Speakers in the Legal System” (2003) 23 Annual Review of 
Applied Linguistics 113; John B Haviland, “Ideologies of Language: Some Reflections on 
Language and U.S. Law” (2003) 105 Am Anthropologist 764; Philipp Sebastian Angermeyer, 
“Creating Monolingualism in the Multilingual Courtroom” (2008) 2 Sociolinguistics Studies 
385; Amy H Liu & Vanessa A Baird, “Linguistic Recognition as a Source of Confidence in 
the Justice System” (2012) 45 Comp Pol Stud 1203. For a good overview of the field, see 
generally Alan Durant & Janny HC Leung, Language and Law (London: Routledge, 2016). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there has never been any empirical analysis of the 
impact of the linguistic proficiency of judges on judicial behaviour in an institutionally 
multilingual setting.
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the language used by the lower courts.6 In Switzerland, the Federal Tribunal is 
composed of 38 judges and the nomination process takes into consideration, 
among other things, linguistic proficiency in the three official languages 
(German, French, and Italian).7 Since the Tribunal sits in panels of three or, 
in more important cases, panels of five judges, all cases can be heard by a panel 
fluent in the language of the parties8. In India, even though English and Hindi 
are official languages, article 348 of the Constitution provides that English is the 
language of the National High Court.9 Likewise, in Kenya, even though English 
and Keswahili are official languages,10 the rules of proceedings of the Supreme 
Court of Kenya provide that English is the only language of the Court.11
Janny Leung suggests that approximately one quarter of the jurisdictions 
worldwide are multilingual.12 An in-depth comparative analysis is thus far 
beyond the scope of this article. However, the institutional design of the Supreme 
Court of Canada that recognizes institutional bilingualism without imposing any 
specific linguistic requirement for its sitting judges raises special concerns about 
the impact of unilingualism on judicial behaviour.
Despite its prominent resurgence in the last ten years or so, the question of 
the place given to French and English at the Supreme Court of Canada is not 
new. Section 133 of the British North America Act, 1867 provides that French 
and English “may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or 
issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from 
all or any of the Courts of Quebec.”13 Despite this provision, early in its history, 
proceedings in French before the Supreme Court of Canada paled in comparison 
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council where Law Lords were more 
acquainted with French law and French language more generally. The Supreme 
6. Loi du 15 juin 1935 concernant l’emploi des langues en matière judiciaire, art 27, online: 
<www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/europe/belgiqueetat-loi1935.htm>.
7. Tribunal Fédéral Suisse, Le Tribunal Fédéral Suisse: Le troisième pouvoir de l’état fédéral, 
(Lausanne: Tribunal Fédéral Suisse, 2016), online: <www.bger.ch/files/live/sites/bger/files/
pdf/fr/bg_broschuere_a4.pdf>.
8. See Loi fédérale sur les langues nationales et la compréhension entre les communautés 
linguistiques, art 6.
9. The Constitution of India (1950), art 348.
10. The Constitution of Kenya (2010), art 7(2).
11. Kenya, Supreme Court Rules (2012), art 6, online: <www.kenyalaw.org/lex//sublegview.
xql?subleg=No.%207%20of%202011>.
12. Janny HC Leung, “Negotiating language status in multilingual jurisdictions: Rhetoric and 
reality” (2016) 209 Semiotica 371.
13. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 133, reprinted in RSC 1985, 
Appendix II, No 5.
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Court of Canada’s unilingualism thus became a recurrent grievance of Quebec 
politicians and lawyers in the first decades of the existence of the Court.14 Even 
once it became the final appellate authority in the Canadian legal system in 1949, 
the Supreme Court of Canada remained largely a unilingual institution. When 
the number of seats reserved for members of the Quebec bar and bench increased 
from two to three in 1949, Prime Minister Louis Saint-Laurent recognized that 
“[t]he Quebec Bar [was] the only [bar] from which it [could] be expected that 
French speaking lawyers [would] ever be appointed to the Supreme Court.”15 
It was only in the 1960s that the Court came under the scrutiny of the Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the “Commission”). As part of 
the Commission, in 1969 Peter H Russell published the first, and to date the 
only, thorough study on the place given to French and English in the work of the 
Court. In his report, Russell lamented the fact that “by any reasonable measure 
of bilingualism, the Court has failed.”16 But Russell came short of recommending 
that all judges should be bilingual even though he stressed that
[i]f the services of such a national tribunal are to be shared on an equal basis by 
both French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians, changes must be made in 
either the Supreme Court’s personnel or its method of conducting its business or 
both which will make it as convenient for French-speaking Canadians to use their 
native language in the Court as it is for English-speaking Canadians to plead their 
cases in English.17
Things changed only incrementally with the adoption of the first Official 
Languages Act in 196918 and, more importantly, the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms in 1982.19 The former established French and English as the official 
languages of Canada and gave individuals the right to give evidence in the 
language of their choosing in any proceedings in criminal matters and before 
any court created by an act of Parliament.20 The Supreme Court of Canada also 
installed a system of simultaneous translation for the unilingual judges and the 
14. Peter H Russell, The Supreme Court of Canada as a Bilingual and Bicultural Institution 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969) at 21.
15. See e.g. James G Snell & Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the 
Institution (Toronto: The Osgoode Society, 1985) at 198.
16. Russell, supra note 14 at 213.
17. Ibid at 215.
18. An Act Respecting the Status of Official Languages in Canada, 17-19 Eliz II c 54 [Official 
Languages Act, 1969].
19. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
20. Official Languages Act, 1969, supra note 18, s 11
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public. More importantly, for the purposes of this article, section 19(1) of the 
Charter protects the right to be heard in one’s official language but it does not 
specify whether that imposes an obligation of bilingualism on the part of the 
sitting judge or judges. The Supreme Court of Canada itself got entangled in this 
debate in the 1986 case Société des Acadiens v Association of Parents21 in which it 
had to decide whether the right to be heard in one’s official language includes 
the right to be heard by a panel of judges fluent in that language. Even though 
the case concerned the capacity of a judge from New Brunswick to understand a 
case brought in French pursuant to section 19(2) of the Charter, the necessity of 
having judges with sufficient proficiency in French and English at the Supreme 
Court of Canada itself was also indirectly at play.
In Société des Acadiens, the majority held that “there is no language guarantee 
[in the Constitution] … that the speaker will be heard or understood, or that 
he has the right to be heard or understood in the language of his choice.”22 The 
Court thus closed the door to an interpretation of section 19(1) of the Charter 
which would require all its members to be bilingual.23 The new 1988 Official 
Languages Act partly remedied the situation by providing a requirement for all 
federal courts to be institutionally bilingual, i.e., that the judges hearing a case 
must be able to understand the parties in the official language of their choice 
“without the assistance of an interpreter.”24 The Official Languages Act does not 
require all members of a given court to be bilingual, but only those hearing a 
case that requires the mastery of both official languages. In practice, this leaves 
enough room for chief justices to make sure that they have enough bilingual 
judges to fulfill their institutional obligations. The Official Languages Act, 
however, explicitly excludes the Supreme Court of Canada from its ambit.25 The 
Court is thus now the only court with federal jurisdiction where a Francophone 
litigant cannot be sure that, were they to choose to plead their case in French, 
21. Société des Acadiens v Association of Parents, [1986] 1 SCR 549, 27 DLR (4th) 406.
22. Ibid at 574-75.
23. Power and Roy note, however, that if the courts were to revisit Société des acadiens, it could 
in all likelihood be overturned in light of many decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada 
since then, including R v Beaulac, [1999] 1 SCR 768, 173 DLR (4th) 193. See Mark C 
Power & Marc-André Roy, “Le droit d’être compris directement par les tribunaux canadiens, 
à l’oral comme à l’écrit, sans l’entremise de services d’interprétation et de traduction” 
(2015) 45 RGD 403 at 425-26. See also, Alyssa Tomkins, “Does Beaulac Reorient Judicial 
bilingualism?” (2008) 39 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 171.
24. Official Languages Act, RSC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp), s 16(1)(a).
25. Ibid, s 16(1).
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they would be understood by the full panel of judges hearing the case without the 
assistance of an interpreter.
Before we move forward, it should be noted that our study is not a theoretical 
or a doctrinal examination of linguistic rights.26 Our analysis is meant to inform 
the debate about judicial bilingualism and to complement it with empirical 
evidence. The increased interest in this question, since approximately 2006, 
appears to us to be driven by political debates rather than doctrinal developments. 
Despite the sensitivity of the issue, no thorough study has empirically assessed 
the actual impact of bilingualism and unilingualism on the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Even if doctrinal debates have an important role to play in this on-going 
discussion, our analysis is meant to inform the broader political debate about this 
important policy choice. Notwithstanding our hope that this study will inform 
future normative debates, it should be seen first and foremost as a contribution 
to the growing empirical literature on judicial behaviour in Canada. By focusing 
on language proficiency, we hope to shed light on an important aspect of a judge’s 
background that is rarely (if ever) studied by scholars of judicial behaviour.
The article is divided in four parts. In Part I, we discuss the framing of the 
debate about judicial bilingualism in Canada over the last decade and survey the 
empirical literature on bilingualism at the Supreme Court of Canada. In Part II, 
we outline the difficulty of studying bilingualism at the Court and explain the 
methodology and coding techniques we have relied on for this study. In Part 
III, we present the main findings of this study namely, the relationship between 
language and panel size, assertiveness, caseload, and deference. In Part IV, 
we discuss the signification of these results and suggest some avenues for further 
research on judicial bilingualism in Canada and other jurisdictions.
I. FRAMING THE DEBATE ABOUT BILINGUALISM: 
LANGUAGE AS A LEGAL OR AN IDENTITY 
REQUIREMENT?
The politically charged debate about bilingualism of Supreme Court of Canada 
judges emerged into prominence after 2006. During their reign from 1993 to 
2006, the federal Liberals had appointed only functionally bilingual judges to the 
highest court, at least according to our own classification which we discuss below. 
However, since the appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Court in 
26. For a doctrinal analysis of constitutional linguistic rights and their impact on bilingualism at 
the Supreme Court of Canada see e.g. Power & Roy, supra note 23.
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2006, the debate about the bilingual capacities of Supreme Court of Canada 
judges has been ignited multiple times and has not seemed to diminish in intensity.
A. DEBATING MANDATORY BILINGUALISM FOR SUPREME COURT OF 
CANADA JUDGES
On 1 March 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper selected Justice Rothstein 
from a shortlist left by the former Liberal government as his first nomination 
to the Supreme Court of Canada. Justice Rothstein was known to be an acute 
legal mind but his nomination was subject to criticism because he did not speak 
French.27 Despite being questioned on this issue during his appearance before the 
Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee reviewing his nomination, his appointment 
did not trigger immediate intense political controversy. However, it has had 
considerable ripple effects in setting the footing for arguments that surfaced soon 
thereafter. Since then, nine bills have been tabled in the House of Commons to 
address the issue of bilingualism at the Court.
When Justice Michel Bastarache resigned in 2008 and the Conservative 
government of Stephen Harper was tasked with choosing his successor as its first 
full Supreme Court of Canada appointee, many were scared by the possibility 
that a government seen as having little sympathy for official bilingualism might 
appoint a unilingual judge from the Maritimes. In anticipation of this eventuality, 
in May 2008, following the nomination of Justice Rothstein, then-Liberal MP 
Denis Coderre introduced Bill C-548 to amend the Official Languages Act and to 
require that judges of the Supreme Court of Canada understand oral argument 
in both official languages without the assistance of an interpreter.28 Similarly, 
Bill C-559 introduced in June 2008 would have amended section 5 of the 
Supreme Court Act to add bilingualism as a requirement for Supreme Court of 
Canada judges.29 Both bills died on the order paper. After the general election of 
October 2008, Bill C-232, similar in substance to C-559, was first introduced 
in November 2008, and again in January 2009, and March 2010 respectively in 
27. See e.g. Yves Boisvert, “Un processus utile et sans danger,” La Presse (28 February 2006), 
online: <numerique.banq.qc.ca/patrimoine/details/52327/2203140?docsearchtext=Roths
tein%20bilingue>.
28. Bill C-548, An Act to Amend the Official Languages Act (understanding the official languages 
– judges of the Supreme Court of Canada), 2nd Sess, 39th Parl, 2008 (Sponsored by D 
Coderre) [Bill C-548].
29. Bill C-559, An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act (understanding the official languages), 2nd 
Sess, 39th Parl, 2008 (Sponsored by Y Godin).
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the first, second, and third sessions of the 40th Parliament.30 Bill C-232 finally 
passed through the House of Commons but died on the Order Paper while at 
the Second Reading stage in the Senate when the 2011 federal elections were 
called. During that time, Stephen Harper appointed Justice Thomas Cromwell 
to the Supreme Court of Canada at the end of 2008. With the nomination of 
Justice Cromwell, a bilingual judge from the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal,  the 
question of Supreme Court bilingualism temporarily receded to the political 
background despite the continuous pressure from opposition parties to enshrine 
this requirement into law.
The May 2011 general federal election provided Stephen Harper’s 
Conservatives with their first majority government. Shortly after the election, 
NDP Member of Parliament Yvon Godin introduced Bill C-208, which was 
similar in substance to Bill C-232, on 13 June 2011.31 The issue was thus already 
a hot topic when Prime Minister Harper appointed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, on 21 October 2011, Justices Andromache Karakatsanis and Michael 
Moldaver, both from the Court of Appeal for Ontario. Justice Karakatsanis 
became fluent in French thanks to a French immersion program in Quebec 
for federal judges administered by the Office of the Commissioner for Federal 
Judicial Affairs of Canada. She had attended the program for two weeks every 
summer during the past eight years and, though not completely trilingual (she 
also speaks Greek), she could still show a very respectable mastery of the French 
language. However, when Justice Moldaver was questioned by members of 
the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee of the House of Commons about his 
fluency in French, he had to apologize for his complete lack of knowledge of 
the language and to recognize that he had let pass all the opportunities that 
Justice Karakatsnis had seized to learn French.32 Justice Moldaver was the second 
unilingual anglophone to be appointed by Stephen Harper to the highest court 
in less than five years following the appointment of Justice Rothstein in 2006.
30. Bill C-232, An Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act (understanding the official languages), 3rd 
Sess, 40th Parl, 2010 (Sponsored by Y Godin) [Bill C-232].
31. Bill C-208, An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act (understanding the official languages), 1st 
Sess, 41st Parl, 2011  (Sponsored by Y Godin). This bill was again reinstated in 2013 but 
was defeated on second reading on 7 May 2014. Bill C-208, An Act to amend the Supreme 
Court Act (understanding the official languages), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl,  (Sponsored by Y Godin); 
House of Commons, Hansard, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, No 82 (7 May 2014), online: <www.
ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-2/house/sitting-82/hansard>.
32. Hélène Buzzetti, “Nominations à la Cour suprême – Mauvais quart d’heure pour le juge  
Moldaver,” Le Devoir (20 October 2011), online: <www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/ 
334020/nominations-a-la-cour-supreme-mauvais-quart-d-heure-pour-le-juge-moldaver>.
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The issue had been so hotly debated that the Liberals, elected into government 
in October 2015, promised during the 2015 federal campaign to appoint only 
bilingual judges to the Court but did not go so far as to promise to entrench such 
a requirement into statute.33 Accordingly, Prime Minister Trudeau released a new 
administrative procedure on 2 August 2016 for the appointment to the Court.34 
Under this new process, “an independent and non-partisan [seven member] 
Advisory Board has been given the task of identifying suitable candidates who 
are jurists of the highest caliber, functionally bilingual, and representative of the 
diversity of our great country.”35
The application questionnaire comprises a section asking candidates whether 
they are able, without further training, (1) to read and understand court materials 
in both official languages; (2) to discuss legal matters with their colleagues in 
both official languages; (3) to converse with counsel in court in both official 
languages; and (4) to understand oral submissions in both official languages.36
This express requirement of functional bilingualism was not met with universal 
approval. The Atlantic Provinces Trial Lawyers Association (“the Association”) 
introduced in the Nova Scotia Supreme Court a constitutional challenge to the 
33. In its 2015 electoral platform, the Liberal Party of Canada wrote: “We will ensure that 
all those appointed to the Supreme Court are functionally bilingual.” See Liberal Party of 
Canada, “Real Change: A New Plan For A Strong Middle Class” (2015), online: <www.
liberal.ca/files/2015/10/New-plan-for-a-strong-middle-class.pdf>.
34. Prime Minister of Canada, News Release, “New process for judicial appointments to the 
Supreme Court of Canada” (2 August 2016), online: <pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/08/02/
prime-minister-announces-new-supreme-court-canada-judicial-appointments-process>.
35. Ibid [emphasis added]. The Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, 
on its website, to which the new appointment procedures refer, has defined functional 
bilingualism as:
The Government has committed to only appoint judges who are functionally bilingual. The 
Supreme Court hears appeals in both English and French.  Written materials may be submitted 
in either official language and counsel may present oral argument in the official language of 
their choice.  Judges may ask questions in English or French.  It is expected that a Supreme 
Court judge can read materials and understand oral argument without the need for translation 
or interpretation in French and English.  Ideally, the judge can converse with counsel during 
oral argument and with other judges of the Court in French or English.
 Canada, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, “Qualifications and 
Assessment Criteria” (2016), online: <www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/scc-csc/qualifications-eng.html> 
[Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, “Qualifications and Assessment Criteria”].
36. Canada, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, “Questionnaire for 
the Supreme Court of Canada Judicial Appointment Process” (2016),  online: <www.fja-cmf.
gc.ca/scc-csc/Questionnaire-SCC-Judicial-Appointment-Process.pdf> at 4.
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new procedure,37 arguing that it jeopardizes regional representation among the 
Court, which they characterized as a constitutional convention. Even though the 
Association did not explicitly address the question of bilingualism, others in the 
Atlantic Provinces went the extra mile and argued that mandatory bilingualism 
conflicts with regional representation at the Court in general.38 On 17 October 
2016, Prime Minister Trudeau selected Justice Malcolm Rowe, a bilingual 
judge from the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal, from among the 
short-listed candidates submitted by the Advisory Board to fill the seat left vacant 
by the retirement of Justice Cromwell on 1 September 2016.39 The appointment 
of Justice Rowe proved critics from the Atlantic Provinces wrong and the 
Association decided to drop its constitutional challenge.
Separately, Senator Murray Sinclair, former Chairman of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and Perry Bellegarde, National Chief of the Assembly 
of First Nations, raised concerns that mandatory bilingualism would impose an 
additional burden on potential First Nations judges in that they would have to 
learn not one, but two additional languages to qualify for the top court.40
Both bodies agree, in substance, that mandatory functional bilingualism is 
discriminatory insofar as it trumps other important elements, such as regional 
37. Sean Fine, “Lawyers challenge Ottawa on Supreme Court appointment changes,” The 
Globe & Mail (19 September 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/
lawyers-challenge-ottawa-on-changes-to-supreme-court-appointments/article31951207>.
38. See e.g. Jackson Doughart, “Supreme Court can be bilingual without every judge being 
so,” Chronicle Herald 12 August 2016), online: <thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/1388032-
opinion-supreme-court-can-be-bilingual-without-every-judge-being-so>. These concerns 
echo those of former Justice John Major who expressed the view that mandatory bilingualism 
would be detrimental to Western representation on the Court. See Janice Tibbetts, “Legal 
community divided over bilingualism on Supreme Court,” Vancouver Sun (2 May 2010), 
online: <www.vancouversun.com/Legal+community+divided+over+bilingualism+Supreme+C
ourt/2977850/story.html>.
39. Chantal Hébert, “Rowe’s Supreme Court appointment sets bilingualism bar quite 
a bit higher,” Toronto Star (27 October 2016), online: <www.thestar.com/news/
canada/2016/10/27/rowes-supreme-court-appointment-sets-bilingualism-bar-quite-a-bit-
higher-hbert.html>.
40. Kristy Kirkup, “Top court’s bilingual rule a barrier to indigenous judges: Sinclair, Bellegrade,” 
The Globe & Mail (22 September 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ 
supreme-courts-bilingual-requirement-unfair-sinclair-bellegarde/article32011596>. 
It is noteworthy, however, that according to the 2016 national census, only 15.6 per cent 
of the Canadian Aboriginal population reported being able to conduct a conversation in 
an Aboriginal language. See Canada, Statistics Canada, “Census in brief: The Aboriginal 
languages of First Nations people, Métis and Inuit” (25 October 2017), online: <www12.
statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/98-200-x/2016022/98-200-x2016022 
-eng.cfm>. We thank an anonymous reviewer of this article for pointing out this statistic.
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or minority representation, that should play a more prominent role in the 
appointment process.
In October 2017, anticipating the appointment of a judge from western 
provinces to replace Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin who would retire at the 
end of 2017, NDP Member of Parliament François Choquette tabled two bills 
successively that were similar in substance to the ones which had been introduced 
in the previous years—one amending the Supreme Court Act41 and the other 
amending the Official Languages Act.42 The Liberal government, with their new 
administrative appointment procedure in place, decided to vote against the bills. 
Bill C-203, which would have amended the Supreme Court Act was defeated in 
the House of Commons on 25 October 2017 even though 17 Liberal Members 
of Parliament broke ranks. At the time this article was written, the other bill 
was still at first reading. These bills have rehashed once more the arguments that 
have now become common place about mandatory bilingualism for Supreme 
Court of Canada judges. NDP Member of Parliament and renowned advocate 
of Indigenous rights Romeo Saganash argued, for example, that the bill would 
“perpetuate colonialism.”43 The federal NDP Leader, Jagmeet Singh, followed 
step after the nomination of Justice Sheilah L. Martin, on 29 October 2017 
in replacement of Chief Justice McLachlin. However, like the appointment of 
Justice Rowe a year earlier, the appointment of Justice Martin, a bilingual judge 
of the Alberta Court of Appeal, seems to have appeased for now the concerns of 
the advocates of mandatory bilingualism.
41. Bill C-203, An Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act (understanding of the official languages), 
1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2015  (Sponsored by F Choquette).
42. Bill C-382, An Act to Amend the Official Languages Act (Supreme Court of Canada), 1st Sess, 
42nd Parl, 2017 (Sponsored by F Choquette).
43. Hélène Buzzetti, “Romeo Saganash combat le bilinguisme à la canadienne,” Le 
Devoir (9 November 2017) online: <www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/512463/
saganash-s-oppose-au-bilinguisme-colonial-a-la-cour-supreme>.
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B. FRAMING THE DEBATE ABOUT MANDATORY BILINGUALISM
The debate about bilingualism of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada 
has been framed around two competing categories: language as an identity and 
language as a legal requirement.44
In the first category which we term “language as an identity requirement,” 
commentators have argued that bilingualism is an asset necessary to represent 
Quebec and other francophone communities in the judicial system.45 While 
being desirable, various political commentators like Barbara Kay,46 politicians 
like former Minister of Justice Rob Nicholson47 and former Supreme Court 
of Canada judge Justice John Major48 have expressed the obvious concern that 
mandatory bilingualism would narrow the pool of competent candidates and 
44. We were tempted to use Hugo Cyr’s formulation of “adjudicative capacity” as opposed to 
“judicial legitimacy.” However, we thought that talking about identity and legal requirement 
was closer in spirit to the empirical literature on judicial decision-making. See Hugo Cyr, 
“The Bungling of Justice Nadon’s Appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014) 
67 SCLR (2d) 73. The difference in the framing of linguistic proficiency for Supreme Court 
of Canada judges tracks more general debates about the desirability of official bilingualism. 
François Charbonneau finds that Anglo-Canadian advocates of bilingualism generally frame 
it as a question of principle while adversaries generally object to mandatory bilingualism 
on pragmatic grounds. Both groups thus generally talk past each other according to 
Charbonneau. The debate about mandatory bilingualism for Supreme Court of Canada 
judges seems to follow a similar pattern. See François Charbonneau, “Un dialogue de 
sourds?: Les arguments invoqués par les défenseurs et les détracteurs du bilinguisme dans 
l’espace anglo-canadien” (2015) 5 Min Ling & Soc 13.
45. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada seems to have adhered at least in part to this 
“identity” requirement regarding judges coming from Quebec in the Nadon Reference. The 
majority wrote:
The purpose of s. 6 is to ensure not only civil law training and experience on the Court, but also 
to ensure that Quebec’s distinct legal traditions and social values are represented on the Court, 
thereby enhancing the confidence of the people of Quebec in the Supreme Court as the final 
arbiter of their rights. Put differently, s. 6 protects both the functioning and the legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court as a general court of appeal for Canada [emphasis in original].
 See Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 at para 49, [2014] 1 SCR 433 
[Nadon Reference].
46. See e.g. Charles Huband, “Unilingualism needs no apology,” Winnipeg Free Press 
(23 December 2011), online: <www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/analysis/
unilingualism-needs-no-apology-136178703.html>.
47. See e.g. the comments of then-Minister of Justice Rob Nicholson 
on this issue, La Presse canadienne, “Nomination des Juges: 
Le mérite plus crucial que le bilinguisme, dit Nicholson,” Le Devoir (12 
November 2012), online: <www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/363793/
nomination-des-juges-le-merite-plus-crucial-que-le-bilinguisme-dit-nicholson>.
48. Tibbetts, supra note 38.
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make the selection process unfair for those who might not have had the chance 
to grow up in a multilingual environment.49 This complaint is arguably a fair 
point when one considers that, according to the 2011 Census, only 10.2 per cent 
of the Canadian population outside of Quebec could sustain a conversation in 
French.50 Moreover, this “identity” requirement could conflict with other valid 
identities and prevent their representation on the Court. In other words, for those 
opposing mandatory bilingualism, appointing bilingual judges should not trump 
the appointment of, for example, women, visible minorities, or First Nations 
judges. These considerations share in common the fact that they see fluency in 
both official languages as an extra-legal factor,51 i.e., as a factor that is valuable in 
that it makes the Court more representative of one linguistic community or more 
attuned to the social dynamics in some segments of the Canadian population, 
but not as a legal competence per se. Just like the fact of being a woman is 
not supposed to influence the content of the law, one can argue that women 
judges have a different perspective on certain issues and they bring into their 
legal judgment these valuable extra-legal considerations.52 By analogy, speaking 
French can connect a judge to the social reality of francophones and this might 
49. See Barbara Kay, “Of course Justin Trudeau wants bilingual judges: he’s the product 
of bilingual privilege,” National Post (28 July 2015), online: <news.nationalpost.com/
full-comment/barbara-kay-of-course-justin-trudeau-wants-bilingual-judges-hes-the-product-
of-bilingual-privilege>.
50. The numbers are almost the same for the 2016 Census with 10.3 per cent. See Canada, 
Statistics Canada, “English, French and Official Minorities Languages in Canada” (2 August 
2017), online: <www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/98-200-x/2016011/98-
200-x2016011-eng.cfm>.
51. The case of First Nations judges is somewhat more complex. What we say here is not that 
First Nations judges would not bring valuable legal competence in their Indigenous tradition 
to the bench. What we say is simply that the complaint of advocates of First Nations judges 
seems to imply that proficiency in French is not a legal competence.
52. For a defence of this view, see Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a 
Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall LJ 507. In the Canadian context, the empirical 
evidence regarding this question seems to be mixed and inconclusive. Compare Peter 
McCormick & Twyla Job, “Do Women Judges Make a Difference? An Analysis by Appeal 
Court Data” (1993) 8 CJLS 135 and James Stribopoulos & Moin A Yahya, “Does a Judge’s 
Party of Appointment or Gender Matter to Case Outcomes?: An Empirical Study of the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario,” (2007) 4 Osgoode Hall LJ 315. For a recent review of the 
literature in the Canadian context, see Donald R Songer, Miroslava Radieva & Rebecca Reid, 
“Gender Diversity in the Intermediate Appellate Courts of Canada” (2016) 37 Just System 
J 4. The idea that women judges bring a different perspective to judging more generally is 
often times influenced by the work of Carol Gilligan. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: 
Psychological Theories and Women’s Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
For a critical discussion of Gilligan’s ideas, especially in the judicial context, see Jennifer 
Nedelsky, “Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law” (1997) 42 McGill LJ 91.
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influence their outlook on certain issues. From a slightly different, though related 
perspective, Supreme Court of Canada judges should arguably reflect or represent 
Canadian diversity and, thus, knowledge of French and English gives preference 
to one specific identity at the expense of other identities more prevalent in the 
composition of Canadian society.
We term the second approach “language as a legal requirement.” Supporters 
of this conception include former-Commissioner of Official Languages Graham 
Fraser,53 former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé,54 
former University of Ottawa professor Sebastien Grammond,55 and the author 
and legal commentator Philip Slayton.56 All of these individuals emphasize that 
speaking French is an essential part of the Canadian lawyer’s toolkit. As former 
Supreme Court of Canada justice and prominent advocate of Canadian 
bilingualism Justice Bastarache points out, given that federal laws as well as the 
laws of Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, New-Brunswick, and Newfoundland and 
Labrador are enacted in both official languages and that both versions have equal 
status, the ability to read the original legal text in both languages is a very useful 
interpretive tool.57 Moreover, knowing both official languages gives the judge 
access to a wider range of doctrinal writings and judicial opinions from lower 
courts across the country and increases the quantity of legal information that can 
feed into the decision-making process.
Those two approaches entail very different assumptions about the impact of 
bilingualism on judicial behaviour. Not all of them are easily measurable however. 
We discuss this in more detail in Parts III and IV below.
53. Commissioner of Official Languages, Beyond Obligations: Annual report 2009-2010, vol I 
(Canada: Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, 2010) at 32. See also Graham 
Fraser, “In defence of a bilingual Supreme Court,” Maclean’s (2 August 2016), online: <www.
macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/in-defence-of-a-bilingual-supreme-court>.
54. Hélène Buzzetti, “Cour Suprême – Le Bilinguisme des juges est essentiel, dit Claire L’Heureux- 
Dubé,” Le Devoir (27 April 2010), online: <www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/287807/
cour-supreme-le-bilinguisme-des-juges-est-essentiel-dit-claire-l-heureux-dube>.
55. See e.g. Sebastien Grammond & Mark Power, Should Supreme Court Judges be Required to be 
Bilingual? (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, 2011).
56. See e.g. Philip Slayton, Mighty Judgment: How the Supreme Court of Canada Runs your Life 
(Toronto: Allan Lane Canada, 2011) at 250.
57. Charter, supra note 19, s. 18(1). Michel Bastarache, The Law of Bilingual Interpretation 
(Toronto: LexisNexis, 2008). Perhaps because of his status as a defender of Canadian 
bilingualism, Justice Bastarache refused to take a side on the issue of mandatory bilingualism 
for Supreme Court judges. See also Michel Bastarache, “Bilingual Interpretation Rules as A 
Component of Language Rights in Canada” in Lawrence M Solan & Peter M Tiersma, eds, 
The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 159.
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C. MEASURING JUDICIAL BILINGUALISM
Leaving aside the normative debate, there seems to be some empirical evidence 
that the Supreme Court, as an institution, remains largely unilingual. For 
example, a study by Peter McCormick published in 2004 suggests that the level 
of penetration of francophone ideas was not as high as anglophone ideas.58 Only 
one out of the twenty authors most cited by the Court during the 1985-2004 
period wrote mainly in French (Albert Mayrand).59 Moreover, of the twenty 
most cited journal articles, only one was in French and was cited only four 
times while many other articles in English were cited much more frequently. 
Though McCormick himself did not break down the ratio of French and English 
citations, Sebastien Grammond and Mark Power, using his numbers, found that 
the ratio of citations of English and French publications by the Court in the 
1985-2004 period was 7:1.60
Another study conducted by Black and Richter suggests that, between 1985 
and 1990, the number of citations of anglophone treatises outnumbered by far 
francophone ones.61 Out of the sixteen most cited legal treatises, the only French 
one was tied for last place with two other English treatises.62
Having reviewed this body of literature, Grammond and Power 
summarize it as follows:
[U]nilingual judges […] are unable to draw upon the rich body of Canadian 
literature written in French. […] The general picture that emerges from those 
studies is one where English-language books and articles overwhelmingly dominate, 
and French-language texts are mostly cited in judgments dealing with civil law or 
other issues peculiar to Quebec.63
Academics have suggested that the lower penetration of francophone legal 
ideas is not limited to the citation of law journal articles or legal treatises. For 
example, Professor Michel Doucet of the University of Moncton argued that 
unilingual judges in general might have a hard time following oral arguments 
58. Peter McCormick, “The Judges and the Journals: Citation of Periodical Literature by The 
Supreme Court of Canada, 1985-2004” (2004) 83 Can Bar Rev 633 [McCormick, “Judges 
and Journals”].
59. Ibid.
60. Grammond & Power, supra note 55, n 26.
61. Vaughan Black & Nicholas Richter, “Did She Mention My Name?: Citation of Academic 
Authority by the Supreme Court of Canada, 1985-1990” (1993) 16 Dal LJ 378.
62. Ibid.
63. Grammond & Power, supra note 55 at 9.
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or written submissions in French, therefore leading to wrong decisions.64 This 
is obviously a matter of great concern, but it is also highly speculative and it 
remains to be seen how this hypothesis could be empirically tested.
Despite those cogent debates, no study has tried to empirically measure 
the actual impact of unilingualism on the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision-making. There have been alleged consequences and indirect evidence 
about the impact of francophone ideas but no direct measurement of the actual 
impact of unilingualism. This kind of enterprise can be difficult because language 
probably plays a marginal role among many other factors. However, we are 
confident that when the decisions are pooled together, it is possible to see some 
trends and some differences between judges who can and those who cannot speak 
French. We will now turn to the measures of the impact of unilingualism and 
bilingualism on judicial behaviour at the Supreme Court of Canada.
II. DATA SET
In order to perform an empirical analysis of the behaviour of unilingual and 
bilingual judges, we combined data that we generated on the language proficiency 
of each judge to the dataset of Supreme Court of Canada decisions compiled 
by professors Andrew Green and Benjamin Alarie of the University of Toronto 
Faculty of Law.65 Our analysis uses all of the Court’s decisions from January 
1969 to July 2013 and compares judges’ behaviour depending on whether 
they heard cases argued in English or French. In three of the four dimensions 
explored—panel-size, assertiveness and caseload—our data suggests that the 
judges’ behaviour is correlated to their level of mastery of both official languages. 
This article does not purport to be a statistically significant prediction of the 
behaviour of unilingual judges; it is simply an empirical analysis of the plausibility 
of some alleged impacts of the appointment of unilingual judges to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.
64. Canada, Justice and Human Rights Committee of the House of Commons, 2nd Sess, 40th Parl 
(15 June 2009) (Michel Doucet), online: <openparliament.ca/committees/justice/40-2/31/ 
michel-doucet-1/only> [Doucet, Justice and Human Rights Committee].
65. For more information on their dataset, see Benjamin A Alarie & Andrew J Green, 
Commitment and Cooperation on High Courts: A Cross-Country Examination of Institutional 
Constraints on Judges, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) [Alarie & Green, Commitment 
and Cooperation].
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A. LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY DATA
We coded all 42 judges of the Supreme Court of Canada who served between 
1969 and 2013 according to their linguistic capacities. We grouped them in three 
broad language categories: (1) unilingual (anglophone), (2) “unknown,” and (3) 
bilingual. In order to tease out the effect of regional origin, we divided the bilingual 
category in two: bilingual from Quebec, and bilingual from the rest of Canada. 
Even though it is difficult to assess objectively the actual level of proficiency of 
judges in French and English, we have relied on three elements to categorize 
them. We first looked at objective biographical elements as published on the 
Court’s website.66 We ranked in the bilingual category all judges who have had 
a bilingual education, i.e., who have studied in two different institutions, one of 
which is anglophone and the other one francophone. Surprisingly, eleven judges 
(26 per cent) had a bilingual education.67 Then, we looked at their professional 
experience and ranked in the bilingual category the judges who had significant 
work experience in the two official languages. Finally, for the remaining judges 
we looked at subjective assessments of their proficiency in French either by their 
biographers or by the mainstream media (such as printed newspapers). Judges 
identified as unilingual are exclusively English speakers.
Unilingual: Estey, Dickson, McIntyre, Wilson, Sopinka, Stevenson, Major, 
Rothstein, Moldaver
Unknown: Martland, Ritchie, Spence, Laskin
Bilingual from R of Canada: Cartwright, Judson, Hall, La Forest, Cory, McLachlin, 
Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, Abella, Charron, Cromwell, Karakatsanis, Le 
Dain
Bilingual from Quebec: Abbott, Fauteux, Pigeon, Beetz, de Grandpré, Pratte, 
Chouinard, Lamer, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Wagner
For the subjective assessment, we had to establish a cut-off point. Since the 
bills introduced on mandatory bilingualism and the new appointment procedure 
use the criterion of understanding oral argument without the assistance of an 
interpreter, we used this criterion as the cut-off. It is important to note that this 
criterion should not always be taken as the appropriate threshold for any kind of 
study. For example, if one wants to assess the level of penetration of francophone 
academic legal ideas among anglophone judges, one might want to look at a judge’s 
ability to read French, not necessarily to understand it orally. Likewise, if one 
66. Short biographies of all past and present justices are available at Supreme Court of Canada, 
“Judges of the Court,” online: <www.scc-csc.ca/judges-juges/index-eng.aspx>.
67. These are Justices Abbott, Hall, Beetz, de Grandpré, Pratte, Chouinard, Le Dain, Gonthier, 
LeBel, Deschamps, and Fish.
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wants to assess whether francophone judges can work in French at the Court, 
as the former Commissioner of Official Languages Graham Fraser among others 
have suggested, one might want to look at a judge’s capacity to speak French.68 
However, since this is the first study on the question, we have decided to rely on 
the threshold used by the main advocates of mandatory bilingualism in the legal 
community,69—the capacity to “read materials and understand oral argument 
without the need for translation or interpretation in French and English.”70
With this criterion in mind, there were still borderline cases. For example, 
in their biography on Chief Justice Brian Dickson, Robert J. Sharpe and Kent 
Roach explain that Dickson learned French while he was sitting on the bench but 
never became fluent. They say:
After his appointment at the Supreme Court of Canada, Dickson took regular 
lessons from a French-language tutor and participated in summer immersion 
programs for judges, including a session at Laval University when he stayed with a 
French family. His modest proficiency in French perhaps never quite matched his 
genuine enthusiasm for bilingualism, but, in his early years on the Court, the other 
anglophone judges had such limited capacity in French that he regularly sat on leave 
applications and appeals from Quebec. He asked Chief Justice Gérard Fauteux, who 
served as chief justice for less than a year after Dickson’s appointment to the Court, 
whether he should spend his time learning civil law or French and ‘he very strongly 
advised learning some more French’. He prepared himself for hearing Quebec 
appeals with meticulous care, even to the extent of figuring out the questions he 
would put to counsel and having his questions translated in advance of the oral 
hearing. He even wrote a short judgment in French, with much help from Pigeon.71
Because he could not formulate his questions directly in French and because 
his level of proficiency in French was low (or non-existent) when he arrived at the 
Court, we ranked him as unilingual.
Ellen Anderson, in her biography of Justice Bertha Wilson writes:
Wilson’s spoken French (somewhat Scots-accented in accordance with her self-
proclaimed status as a member of an ‘oral minority’) was clearly competent. She 
could read French slowly but confidently; occasionally she would call on her court 
attendant, Jean-Marie Plourde, for help when she got stuck with an idiom. But in 
no way did she consider herself to be bilingual, comfortably capable of following 
the oral submissions of French-speaking counsel or the questions put to counsel 
by the French-speaking members of the Court. ‘There wasn’t a day passed that I 
68. See also Fraser, supra note 53.
69. See e.g. Grammond & Power, supra note 55. Bill C-232, supra note 30 and Bill 
C-548, supra note 28.
70. Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, “Qualifications and Assessment 
Criteria,” supra note 35.
71. Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: Osgoode Society 
for Canadian Legal History, 2003) at 413.
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didn’t feel that I was missing something through that gap’ she said, adding, ‘I can 
remember counsel, one French-speaking counsel whose whole argument had been 
conducted in French saying one day, “I know that Justice Wilson is desperate to ask 
a question and she is not doing it because she does not think she can articulate it in 
French, please do it in English, I am perfectly fluent in English.”’ He was right; she 
swallowed her embarrassment and spoke up.72
Because Justice Wilson could hardly formulate a question in French and 
because she reports that she was missing parts of the arguments going on in 
French, we also ranked her as unilingual.
The most difficult case was perhaps Justice Bora Laskin. Philip Girard’s 
biography on the former Chief Justice does not address the specific issue of 
his fluency in French, even if he acknowledges that Chief Justice Laskin was 
not especially comfortable in French.73 According to Girard’s—who clerked for 
Estey in 1979-1980—best recollections,74 Laskin could read French but was not 
bilingual. As best as he can remember, and according also to one of Girard’s 
colleagues who clerked for Chief Justice Laskin in 1981-1982, Alan N. Young, 
Chief Justice Laskin did not use earphones for simultaneous translation during 
oral arguments conducted in French. However, as Girard himself admits, his 
recollections go back more than 30 years ago and it would be difficult now to give 
an objective assessment of Chief Justice Laskin’s proficiency in French. We ranked 
Chief Justice Laskin in the “unknown” category.
We ranked the judges for which there was not enough information in the 
“unknown” category to minimize the impact of a wrong coding. Overall, four 
judges were ranked in this category because of lack of information.75 That being 
said, the behaviour of those judges was close to those ranked in the unilingual 
category and suggest that they were probably closer to unilingual than bilingual.
Because we studied only the impact of English unilingualism, we have 
decided to code all francophone judges as bilingual. There are three reasons for 
this. First, it is generally agreed that on average the proficiency in English of 
francophone judges is much higher than the proficiency in French of anglophone 
judges.76 Second, if there is little objective information about the level of 
proficiency in French of anglophone judges, there is virtually no information 
whatsoever about the proficiency in English of francophone judges (except 
72. Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: Osgoode Society for 
Canadian Legal History, 2001) at 186.
73. Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian 
Legal History, 2005) at 430.
74. Email from Philip Girard, (1 April 2016) on file with author.
75. These are Justices Martland, Ritchie, Spence, and Chief Justice Laskin.
76. See Russell, supra note 14. See also Buzzetti, supra note 54.
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for the objective biographical elements identified above). Third, as the level of 
proficiency in English demonstrated by francophone judges is generally high, 
drawing a boundary between them could be difficult. Creating two linguistic 
categories for francophone judges would exaggerate minor differences, reporting 
them as bigger than they are in reality.
The list of all judges who served between 1969 and 2013 with their respective 
coding and the reason for such coding are found in Appendix A of this article.
B. SAMPLE
We examined all decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada from 1969 to 2013 
compiled by Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green of the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Toronto.77 We have used this time-frame for two reasons. First, 
the only in-depth analysis of the impact of language proficiency on judicial 
decision-making at the Supreme Court of Canada by Peter H. Russell was 
published in 1969 and we thought it was time to revisit some of the reasons 
that motivated his work as part of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism.78 The study by Russell is a great source of information and of 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. However, Russell did not attempt to classify 
systematically all judges according to their proficiency in French and English. 
Though he discussed some judges’ specific level of fluency in French, he only 
relied on the province of origin when quantitatively assessing judicial behaviour. 
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study of judicial behaviour that 
takes language proficiency as the independent variable. Second, the first Official 
Languages Act was originally passed in 1969 and we thought it would be interesting 
to measure whether this general milestone in Canadian linguistic policy, despite 
the lack of a formal entrenchment of mandatory bilingualism for Supreme Court 
of Canada judges, has had an impact on judicial behaviour.
In order to identify cases likely to have been argued in French, we have 
used the decisions from the Quebec Court of Appeal as a proxy for francophone 
cases. This entails two obvious limitations. First, this obscures the fact that 
other cases from the rest of Canada can bring into play the requirement of 
mandatory institutional bilingualism. However, we assume that these are rather 
marginal since the proportion of francophones outside Quebec has always been 
significantly smaller than the proportion of anglophones in Quebec during the 
period we are studying. Thus, there was a higher probability, ceteris paribus, that 
cases in our sample were argued in English in Quebec than that cases were argued 
77. The information regarding the coding and the data set can be found in Alarie & Green, 
Commitment and Cooperation, supra note 65.
78. Russell, supra note 14.
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in French in the rest of Canada. Even if our categorization ranks francophone 
cases from the rest of Canada in our “English” category and anglophone cases 
from Quebec in our “French” category, by doing so we erred on the side of 
caution and potentially down-played the actual impact of language on judicial 
behaviour. Second, we are conscious that some cases from the Federal Court 
of Appeal might have been argued in French. Because it is harder, in terms of 
coding, to assess the language used by the Federal Court of Appeal we decided 
to leave them aside and to include them in our anglophone category. Again, 
if we were able to disentangle Federal Court of Appeal cases that were argued in 
French from those that were argued in English, the differences might be starker. 
Here again we erred on the side of caution.
The cases are therefore grouped in two categories depending on their regional 
origin – i.e., cases from Quebec and cases from the Rest of Canada (“RoC”), 
including the Federal Court of Appeal. Throughout the remainder of this article, 
we will constantly compare judges’ behaviour when faced with these two broad 
categories of cases: cases likely to have been argued in English (RoC cases) and 
cases likely to have been argued in French (Quebec cases). In order to tease out 
the impact of legal specialization in civil or common law, our analysis is also 
restricted to federal law cases, i.e., cases for which all judges are supposed to 
have a more or less equal knowledge of the law. These areas of federal law are: 
aboriginal law, administrative law, citizenship, immigration and refugee law, civil 
rights and liberties and human rights, criminal law and procedure, division of 
powers, intellectual property law, and international law.
III. FINDINGS
Looking at all federal law cases from 1969 to 2013, we measured four different 
potential impacts of judicial unilingualism. We tried to assess whether it affects: 
(a) the size and the composition of the panel, (b) the level of assertiveness of 
individual judges, (c) the linguistic composition of the caseload of each judge 
and, (d) the level of deference towards francophone appellate courts.
A. PANEL SIZE AND COMPOSITION
We first looked at the size of the panel in cases originating from Quebec to see if 
language proficiency could be determinant of the panel size. Our first hypothesis 
can be stated thus:
H1: Since unilingual judges might have a harder time understanding cases coming from 
Quebec because they are argued in French, they will be assigned to fewer Quebec cases 
and the average panel-size for cases from Quebec will be smaller.
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Unsurprisingly, the average size of the panel for all cases coming from Quebec 
(6.57), regardless of the area of law, was significantly smaller than cases from 
the rest of Canada (7.11). One easy explanation is that civil law cases coming 
from Quebec are generally heard by smaller panels, therefore reducing the overall 
average panel-size for Quebec cases.79
As previously noted, to tease out the impact of legal specialization in civil 
and common law from the impact of linguistic proficiency, we looked at the 
average panel size in areas of federal law only. Overall, for federal law cases, the 
average panel-size between 1969 and 2013 was 7.45 judges for the RoC and 
7.18 judges for Quebec cases. The difference between the average panel-size for 
cases coming from Quebec (7.18) compared with those coming from the rest of 
Canada (7.45) is thus also smaller in federal law cases and cannot be explained by 
legal specialization. Moreover, federal law cases coming from Quebec are heard 
on average by significantly smaller panels than federal law cases coming from the 
rest of Canada regardless of the time period: As shown in Table 1, the discrepancy 
is observed across the courts of all chief justices. The only three provinces whose 
differences in average panel size are statistically significant80 are Quebec with an 
average of 7.18 judges, Newfoundland and Labrador with an average of 6.75 
judges, and Ontario with an average of 7.69 judges. The smaller average panel-size 
for Newfoundland and Labrador can be explained by the higher proportion of 
“as of right” cases coming to the Court from this province during this period 
since they tend to be heard by smaller panels. The proportion of “as of right” 
cases from Newfoundland and Labrador (57 per cent) was the highest among all 
provinces and substantially higher than the national average (30 per cent). The 
proportion of “as of right” appeals from Quebec (29 per cent), in comparison, 
was close to the national average.
79. The Supreme Court Act requires that three of the nine justices of the Supreme Court 
of Canada come from Quebec. This ensures that the Supreme Court is composed of a 
minimum of civil law trained judges. The Chief Justice can thus use these three judges to 
compose panels of five judges where they form a civilist majority. See Supreme Court Act, 
RSC 1985, c S-26, s 6.
80. Following the examples of Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 52 and Benjamin Alarie & 
Andrew Green, “Policy Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of 
Canada” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hal LJ 1 and others, we report P-values for statistical tests 
based on the assumption that every studied case is independent and drawn randomly from 
a large population of all possible cases. This assumption of independence might not always 
be satisfied. For instance, larger panels in cases from Ontario could theoretically be linked 
to smaller panels in Quebec due to the judges’ limited time. Therefore P-values should be 
interpreted with caution. We report them anyway, as they are a useful interpretation tool. 
Unless specified otherwise, the P-values reported are for two-sided T-test for difference of 
means, assuming equal variance.
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TABLE 1: AVERAGE PANEL SIZE FOR SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
CASES, 1969-2013
Cases from  
Rest of Canada
Cases from  
Quebec Diff. of  
meansb 










































































a. Studied cases range from 1 January 1969 to 27 July 2013
b. Two sided T-test for difference of means, assuming equal variance
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The logical next step was to inquire into whether language proficiency has an 
impact on who sits on those cases and whether it is a plausible explanatory factor 
for the difference in average panel-size. We looked at the panel composition to 
see if unilingual judges were more likely to be left aside in federal law cases from 
Quebec. To do so, we looked at the probability of a judge not to sit on a given 
case. The results are reproduced in Table 2 below. The results show that language 
is correlated with the likelihood to be exempted from federal law cases from 
Quebec. For example, unilingual and unknown judges had a probability of 30 
per cent of being exempted from federal law cases coming from Quebec while 
bilingual judges had a probability of 17 per cent and Quebec judges a probability 
of only 11 per cent of being exempted from such cases. Interestingly, these results 
suggest that Quebec judges were as likely to be exempted from civil law cases 
from Quebec as they were to be exempted from federal law cases coming from 
Quebec. Meanwhile, RoC bilingual judges were still much more likely to sit on 
civil law cases than their unilingual colleagues even if they might not have any 
training in this area. Thus, legal specialization in civil or common law is perhaps 
overemphasized when it comes to describing the actual work of the Court. 
Regional and linguistic elements play, in all likelihood, a significant role when it 
comes to assigning judges to cases argued in French.
TABLE 2: PROBABILITY OF BEING “EXEMPTED” FROM A CASE, PER LINGUISTIC 
GROUP, FOR CASES FROM THE ROC AND QUEBEC










Unilingual 25% 30% < 0,001
Unknown 24% 27% 0,331
RoC Bilingual 21% 17% < 0,001








Unilingual 18% 39% < 0,001
Unknown 21% 50% < 0,001
RoC Bilingual 15% 20% < 0,001
Quebec 27% 11% < 0,001
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This suggests that the level of fluency in French might be an important 
factor influencing both the size and the composition of the panel in cases coming 
from Quebec, regardless of whether they are federal law cases or provincial law 
cases. This sheds new light on the grievance expressed by some critics of judicial 
unilingualism who argue that francophone litigants cannot have a fair hearing at 
the Supreme Court of Canada because some judges cannot understand their oral 
argument.81 While this can be true when the Court hears a francophone case with 
a full panel of nine judges, this situation may be less frequent than is generally 
expected because francophone cases are heard on average by smaller panels and 
unilingual judges are most likely to be the ones left aside in those cases. When the 
Court is composed of seven or eight bilingual judges, francophone litigants can 
be heard most of the time by a panel of five or seven bilingual judges, a pattern 
compatible with our data. On the other hand, if anglophone judges are left 
aside in cases in their area of expertise because they are argued in French, the 
francophone litigants might “lose” these judges’ otherwise valuable voice simply 
because their case is argued in French.
B. ASSERTIVENESS
The second dimension that we investigated is the level of assertiveness of 
unilingual judges in cases coming from Quebec. Assertiveness can be defined as 
the fact of making one’s voice heard. We thus measured it as the probability that 
a judge will write an opinion every time he or she hears a case. Judges who write 
opinions more often are considered more assertive. Assertiveness is somewhat 
linked to collegiality82 (judges who are more collegial are often less assertive, they 
tend to “go with the flow”) but it captures a different dimension of a judge’s 
behaviour.83 A low level of assertiveness, measured as a low probability of writing 
an opinion, indicates that a judge often prefers to endorse the opinion of one 
of his or her colleagues, be it in a majority, a concurrence, or a dissent, rather 
81. See e.g. Doucet, Justice and Human Rights Committee, supra note 64.
82. On collegiality generally and its impact on judicial behaviour in the Canadian context, see 
Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Should They All Just Get Along? Judicial Ideology, 
Collegiality, and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 58 UNBLJ 73 and 
Alarie & Green, Commitment and Cooperation, supra note 65 at ch 8.
83. Here is an example of a situation where assertiveness and collegiality are not linked. In a case 
coming from Quebec, a decision could have one majority opinion and two dissents, all three 
opinions being authored by a Quebec judge. If bilingual judges join one of the dissents, 
this would normally be seen as not being collegial because they do not follow the majority. 
However, they cannot be described as being assertive because they do not write an opinion, 
they simply decide to follow another colleague who is not in the majority.
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than expressing his or her own views. Therefore, with regards to the level of 
assertiveness of unilingual judges, we made the following hypothesis:
H2: Unilingual judges are less assertive in cases where they cannot understand the oral 
arguments or the briefs submitted and are thus more likely to join their fellow bilingual 
colleagues either in the majority, in a concurrence, or a dissent in francophone cases.
To measure the level of assertiveness, we looked at the probability that a 
judge writes an opinion when sitting in a federal law case coming from Quebec 
or the RoC. Assertiveness is thus not correlated to panel size; it simply measures 
the probability that, when a judge hears a case, he or she writes an opinion in 
that particular case. Since it is difficult to sort out which judge was more active 
in the drafting process when an opinion was co-authored, we looked at both solo 
opinions (i.e., the opinion of the majority, a concurrence, or a dissent that was 
signed by only one author) and joint opinions despite that the differences are small.
Figure 1 below shows the probability, for each judge, of writing a solo 
opinion when hearing a federal law case from Quebec and from the rest of 
Canada between 1969 and 2013. For example, in federal law cases coming from 
Quebec that Justice Fauteux heard from 1969 onward, he wrote a solo opinion 
81 per cent of the time. Similarly, Chief Justice Wagner wrote a solo opinion in 
50 per cent of federal law cases coming from Quebec that he heard in his first 
year. At the other extreme, Justices Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Rothstein, Judson, 
and Abbott never wrote a solo opinion in a federal law case coming from Quebec.
On average, a judge had a probability of 19 per cent of writing a solo opinion 
when he or she sat on a federal law case coming from Quebec. Interestingly, all 
unilingual judges had a probability of writing a solo opinion that is lower than 
the average judge on the Court.
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL742
FIGURE 1: PROBABILITY OF WRITING A SOLO OPINION, PER JUSTICE, FOR 
FEDERAL LAW CASES HEARD FROM QUEBEC AND THE ROC, 1969-2013
†: Heard less than 150 federal law cases from 1969 to 2013.
The picture becomes even clearer when judges are aggregated by linguistic 
group. Table 3 below reproduces the data shown in Figure 1 by individual judges 
(and adds joint opinions) once aggregated by linguistic group. Table 3 outlines 
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the probability that a judge from a given linguistic group will write a solo or a 
joint opinion in a federal law case coming either from Quebec or the RoC. When 
grouped together, it becomes manifest that unilingual judges are significantly less 
likely to write an opinion in a federal law case if it originates from Quebec. For 
example, a unilingual judge has a 12 per cent chance of writing a solo opinion 
when he or she hears a case coming from Quebec, while a bilingual judge has 
15 per cent chance, and a Quebec judge has 29 per cent chance. On the other 
hand, a unilingual judge has a 26 per cent chance of writing a solo opinion in a 
federal law case coming from the RoC as compared to 20 per cent for a bilingual 
judge and 18 per cent for a Quebec judge. This suggests that there is a correlation 
between the level of proficiency in French and the probability of writing an 
opinion in a federal law case from Quebec.
TABLE 3: PROBABILITY OF WRITING AN OPINION PER LINGUISTIC GROUP WHEN 




Solo opinion Solo or joint opinion Diff. of pcta 
P valueRoC case Quebec case RoC case Quebec case
Unilingual 26% 12% 27% 14% < 0,001
Unknown 20% 10% 20% 11% < 0,001
RoC 
Bilingual 20% 15% 23% 17% < 0,001
Quebec 18% 29% 19% 31% < 0,001
a. Two sided T-test for difference of percentage in solo opinion. Using solo or joint opinion 
yields similar results.
Interestingly, these numbers also suggest that bilingual and Quebec judges 
are less likely to write opinions in cases coming from the rest of Canada than their 
unilingual colleagues. There are two complementary possible explanations for 
these findings. The first explanation is that judges might either volunteer for or be 
assigned by the Chief Justice to write an opinion in cases in which they can speak 
the language used by the parties. This linguistic separation of labour is normally 
not captured by other accounts of the internal workings of the Court.84 The 
84. Emmett MacFarlane, for example, in his analysis of the work of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, never touches on the question of language. See Emmett MacFarlane, Governing from 
the Bench: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Role, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).
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second and related explanation is what might be termed “assertiveness aversion.”85 
Since bilingual judges (and even more so Quebec judges) must devote more time 
to francophone federal law opinions, they have less time overall to devote to other 
decisions, therefore reducing their level of assertiveness in RoC cases. Because 
of their increased caseload in francophone federal law cases, bilingual judges 
might have the tendency not to voice their opinion when it comes to anglophone 
federal law cases because this would increase their overall caseload and they thus 
prefer to go along with their colleagues. In other words, increased caseload for 
one linguistic group on the bench could have the indirect effect of silencing the 
judges of this group in other cases.
C. CASELOAD
The third dimension that we examined is the linguistic distribution of the federal 
law caseload of each judge. By looking at this, we wanted to assess the claim that 
Quebec and bilingual judges write more opinions for Quebec federal law cases 
than their unilingual colleagues. We made this hypothesis:
H3: Because they have a low proficiency in French, the proportion of the opinions 
of unilingual judges for federal law cases coming from Quebec as compared to those 
coming from the RoC (i.e., their federal law caseload) will be lower than their bilingual 
colleagues.
Before we move forward, it is important to note that this dimension is 
correlated with our two previous findings, namely that unilingual judges hear 
fewer federal law cases coming from Quebec than their bilingual and Quebec 
colleagues and, even when they hear them, they have a lower probability of 
writing an opinion in the case. Given that unilingual judges hear fewer federal 
law cases and write less often in those cases, their overall federal law caseload will 
be, ceteris paribus,  composed of fewer of those cases than their bilingual and 
Quebec colleagues. This gives a picture of the linguistic distribution of the federal 
law caseload of each individual judge.
As shown in Figure 2, Supreme Court of Canada judges wrote on average 14 
per cent of their federal law opinions in cases coming from Quebec and 86 per 
cent in cases coming from the rest of Canada. Interestingly, bilingual judges write 
a significantly higher proportion of their federal law opinions for cases coming 
from Quebec than their unilingual colleagues.
85. Epstein, Landes & Posner repeatedly use the concept of “dissent aversion.” We borrow the 
concept from them but use it in a slightly broader way to capture assertiveness in general and 
not only dissents. See especially Lee Epstein, William Landes & Richard Posner, The Behavior 
of Federal Judges (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013) ch 6.
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This suggests that language might play a role similar to legal specialization 
in the composition of the caseload of each judge. Donald Songer has shown 
that judges tend to specialize in one or two areas of law that represent a larger 
share of their caseload.86 It seems that language plays out in the same way and 
might be another kind of specialization that superimposes itself over other legal 
specialization. Some judges thus become “French experts” as others are criminal 
law experts or corporate law experts.
86. Donald R Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical 
Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 131-32.
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FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF JUSTICES, PER OPINION AUTHORED 
OR CO-AUTHORED, FOR FEDERAL LAW CASES FROM QUEBEC AND 
THE ROC, 1969-2013
† : Heard less than 150 federal law cases from 1969 to 2013.
One must remember that the proportions shown in Figure 2 are for federal 
law cases, i.e., cases for which judges are presumed to be equally competent (even 
though their degree of specialization may indeed vary). However, irrespective of 
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their degree of specialization in federal law, the caseload coming from Quebec 
is distributed unevenly between unilingual and bilingual judges partly along 
linguistic lines. For example, Justice Rothstein, a federal law expert who served 
for 14 years on the Martial Court, the Federal Court, and the Federal Court of 
Appeal before being appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, wrote only 
one opinion in a federal law case coming from Quebec: A short seven paragraph 
dissent co-authored with the bilingual Chief Justice McLachlin.87 Similarly, 
Justice William McIntyre, who was considered to be a criminal law expert, wrote 
only 10 per cent of his federal law opinions in cases coming from Quebec. The 
problem with this kind of linguistic specialization is that it might silence the 
valuable voice of unilingual experts that cannot address important issues in their 
field simply because they were raised in a case where they could not understand 
the language of the parties.
If we assume that all cases are equally complex and equally labour-consuming, 
this suggests that bilingual and Quebec judges devote more time to Quebec 
federal law cases than their unilingual colleagues. As we will discuss in the next 
section, this might be problematic in that it can reinforce the “two solitudes” 
on the bench. When judges are grouped in their linguistic categories as presented 
in Table 4, the results show clearly the difference between unilingual, unknown, 
bilingual, and Quebec judges in terms of the proportion of all the opinions they 
write for federal law cases (i.e., the number of opinions they write either as author 
or coauthor in the majority judgement, a concurrence or a dissent).
TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL FEDERAL LAW CASELOAD,  
PER LINGUISTIC GROUP, 1969-2013
Justice’s linguistic group
Proportion of opinions written  
(majority, concurrence and dissent)
Cases from Qc Cases from RoC
Unilingual 7% 93%
Unknown 8% 92%
RoC Bilingual 12% 88%
Quebec 25% 75%
Uni. vs Bilingual P value < 0,001 < 0,001
87. R v Ouellete, 2009 SCC 24.
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D. DEFERENCE
The last dimension that we examined is the impact of language on the level 
of deference towards appellate courts. We measure the level of deference as 
the likelihood of a judge overturning the lower court’s decision. Scholars have 
often noted that common law judges might be more deferential towards civil 
law appellate courts than towards common law ones.88 While this hypothesis is 
highly plausible, especially in private law cases, it is also possible that unilingual 
judges are more deferential towards francophone appellate courts even if the 
ruling is in an area of federal law. With regard to the level of deference, we thus 
made the following hypothesis:
H4: Unilingual judges will be more deferential towards the Court of Appeal when they 
cannot fully understand the case coming before them and will therefore tend to have a 
lower overturn rate in these cases compared to other judges.
After inspection, this hypothesis is not supported by the data. If our 
hypothesis were right then unilingual judges would have a lower overturn rate 
in federal law cases from Quebec than their bilingual and Quebec colleagues. 
However, when we inspect unilingual, bilingual, unknown, and Quebec judges’ 
overturn rates, the linguistic groups do not behave differently. There seems to be 
no significant difference in their level of deference for federal law cases coming 
from Quebec and from the RoC. Table 5 presents the proportion of cases where 
each linguistic category of judges voted to overturn the Quebec Court of Appeal’s 
decision as compared to cases coming from other appellate courts from the 
RoC. Interestingly, there is almost no statistically significant difference between 
linguistic groups in their overturn rate.
88. See e.g. Snell & Vaughan, supra note 15 at 228-229. The authors comment on the decision 
Lachine v Industrial Glass Co Ltd, [1978] 1 SCR 988, in which Justices Pigeon and Pratte 
dissented while Justices Laskin, Judson, and Spence formed the majority, upholding the 
decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal. Snell and Vaughan do not touch on the question of 
the impact of language proficiency on the behaviour of the three anglophone judges (Justices 
Laskin and Spence are classified in our “unknown” category). By focusing only on federal 
law cases, we tried to tease out the impact of language from the impact of the different 
legal traditions.
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TABLE 5: LEVEL OF DEFERENCE OF INDIVIDUAL JUDGES PER LINGUISTIC 





Diff. of pct 




Unilingual 42% 52% < 0,001
Unknown 41% 46% 0,128
RoC Bilingual 44% 51% < 0,001
Quebec 42% 51% < 0,001
These results should be interpreted with caution to ensure that one does 
not infer from them more than is actually warranted. Let us start with what 
the results tell.
The results do show that individual judges at the Court disagree more often 
with the Quebec Court of Appeal than they do with other appellate courts, 
regardless of their proficiency in French. These findings for the behaviour of 
individual judges are not very surprising given that previous studies have already 
shown that decisions of the Quebec Court of Appeal are overturned more often 
by the Supreme Court of Canada than most other appellate courts in Canada.89 
Our results tell us also that this does not seem to be influenced by the linguistic 
capacities of the individual judges.
However, the results do not show whether Quebec, bilingual, and unilingual 
judges vote in the same way. Imagine a court constantly split 5-4 where unilingual 
and bilingual judges are systematically on opposing sides. Even if they all vote 50 
per cent of the time to overturn the Court of Appeal, the results in the aggregate 
would not tell us much about this pattern despite the fact that bilingual and 
unilingual judges would vote completely differently. Thus, the results do not 
tell us whether Quebec, bilingual, and unilingual judges vote differently. They 
simply tell us that, overall, Supreme Court of Canada judges vote as frequently to 
overturn the decisions of appellate courts regardless of their linguistic proficiency. 
Also, the results do not tell us whether unilingual judges follow the leadership of 
89. Michael H Lubetsky & Joshua A Krane, “Appealing Outcomes: A Study of the Overturn 
Rate of Canada’s Appellate Courts” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 131.
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their bilingual or Quebec colleagues by voting with them. Finally, the results do 
not tell us whether unilingual judges vote differently in Quebec cases than they 
do in cases from the RoC. We think that future research should try to assess the 
impact of linguistic proficiency on those dimensions of judicial behaviour.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Since this study is the first that seeks to assess empirically the impact of 
unilingualism at the Supreme Court of Canada, the results are provisory and 
exploratory in nature. There are still many blind spots and the results here do not 
prove that there is a causal link between unilingualism and judicial behaviour but 
simply a statistically significant correlation between these two variables. Further 
studies should try to control for other confounding variables such as temporal 
factors, the province of origin of the judge, the complexity of the case, the area 
of law at issue, or the appointing party. Moreover, other ways of categorizing the 
level of fluency in both official languages (e.g., native speaker, second language, 
unilingual, etc.) might lead to slightly different results. Despite this, our results 
suggest four different conclusions.
First, language proficiency of individual judges might affect the size and 
the composition of panels at the Supreme Court of Canada. This is based on 
our finding that the panel size for federal law cases was statistically significantly 
lower for federal law cases coming from Quebec than for those coming from 
the RoC. Moreover, since unilingual judges were more likely to be “exempted” 
from federal law cases coming from Quebec than their Quebec and bilingual 
colleagues, this suggests that language might influence both the size and the 
composition of panels.
Second, our findings suggest that linguistic proficiency might have an 
impact on the level of assertiveness of judges. This conclusion is based on our 
finding that unilingual judges have a lower probability of writing a solo or a 
joint opinion when they hear a federal law case coming from Quebec than their 
bilingual colleagues, a relationship that is the opposite when the Court hears a 
federal law case coming from the RoC.
Third, our findings suggest that linguistic proficiency might influence the 
individual distribution of federal law caseload. This conclusion, in line with the 
two previous findings, is based on the fact that Quebec and bilingual judges write 
a higher proportion of their federal law opinions in cases coming from Quebec 
than their unilingual colleagues.
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Fourth, our findings suggest that, all other things being equal, linguistic 
proficiency does not seem to affect the level of deference towards appellate courts. 
This conclusion is based on our findings that unilingual, bilingual, and Quebec 
judges have a similar overturn rate for federal law cases coming from Quebec. 
Further research should try to see whether this is true across all areas of law or 
whether judges are more prone to be deferential in certain kinds of cases, such as 
linguistic rights or federalism cases.
These findings are important for three main reasons. First, in federal law 
cases coming from Quebec, bilingual judges might have more influence than 
unilingual judges. Since the panel size is on average smaller, a lack of bilingualism 
might be detrimental to unilingual judges because they cannot make their voices 
heard in a significant proportion of cases of importance for the whole country. 
However, we have not taken into consideration the level of complexity and the 
importance of the cases.90 It is possible that unilingual judges are more assertive in 
more complex and important issues. Future research should explore this question.
The second reason is that this linguistic separation of labour might perpetuate 
“two solitudes” at the Court.91 Because Quebec and bilingual judges sit, write, 
and devote more of their time to francophone cases than their unilingual 
colleagues do, francophone judges are more likely to write for a francophone 
audience, using francophone citations while anglophone judges are more likely 
to write for an anglophone audience using anglophone citations. When one takes 
into consideration the additional fact that media coverage of the Court is very 
different in francophone and anglophone media,92 this is hardly fertile ground for 
any kind of cross-breeding of the two legal solitudes of Canadian law.
The third reason is directly related to the form of normative debates we 
have discussed in Part I. Since language proficiency seems to affect panel size 
90. On “complexity” and the distribution of opinion-writing, see Peter McCormick, “Judgment 
and Opportunity: Decision Assignment on the McLachlin Court” (2015) 38 Dal LJ 271.
91. On this issue, see Roderick A MacDonald, “Legal Bilingualism” (1997) 42 McGill LJ 
119. See also Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, Les solitudes du bijuridisme au Canada 
(Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 2005). Interestingly, Peter McCormick pointed out that the 
decisions of the Court of Appeal of Quebec represented only 3 per cent of cross-citations 
among Canadian Courts of Appeal while the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
represented 40 per cent of all such citations. Given the size of the province and the caseload 
of its Court of Appeal, this is hardly explainable only in terms of the civil/common law 
distinction. See Peter McCormick, “Judicial Authority and the Provincial Courts of Appeal: 
A Statistical Investigation of Citation Practices” (1993-1994) 22 Man LJ 286 at 297.
92. On the difference between French and English media coverage of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, see Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman & David Taras, The Last Word: Media 
Coverage of the Supreme Court of Canada, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) at 49-56.
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and opinion writing, bilingualism looks like a legal characteristic. By this we mean 
that language, like other legal skills, seems to play a role in explaining who sits 
on which cases, who voices his or her opinion, and on which cases judges devote 
most of their time. Thus, at least when it comes to describing the actual working 
of the Court and the behaviour of its judges, linguistic proficiency is like another 
legal characteristic. In other words, it is as if language proficiency superimposes 
itself as an additional layer of specialization in addition to traditional subject 
matter legal specialization. As for the impact of bilingualism as an “identity” 
requirement discussed in Part I, future research should try to assess whether 
unilingual, bilingual, and Quebec judges vote differently. At least when it comes 
to deference to francophone appellate courts, it seems that linguistic identity does 
not play a critical role—i.e., Quebec and bilingual judges do not seem to have 
any stronger “affiliation” to the Quebec Court of Appeal than their unilingual 
colleagues. Admittedly, our results are only provisory and future research should 
try to assess whether the “identity” dimension of linguistic proficiency influences 
other aspects of judicial behaviour.
As we pointed out in the introduction, the empirical literature on the 
impact of multilingualism in judicial institutions is almost non-existent both in 
Canada and in other jurisdictions. Here are five paths that are worth exploring 
in future studies:
1. Does unilingualism influence the level of penetration of legal ideas 
coming from the other linguistic legal culture?93 In other words, 
do judges tend to cite less treatises, journal articles, or appellate 
courts’ decisions when they are not or less fluent in this language?
2. What is the impact of francophone interveners as compared to 
anglophone interveners? Some studies suggest that interveners at 
the Supreme Court of Canada have a moderating effect on judicial 
behaviour.94 Is the relative impact of such interveners greater for 
anglophone submissions as compared to francophone submissions? 
Are anglophone interveners more successful at influencing the vote 
of unilingual judges than francophone interveners?
93. Peter McCormick has studied the level of citations of journal articles cited by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Even though his findings are interesting from an aggregate perspective, 
he does not break down citations for individual justices nor does he calculate the number of 
francophone and anglophone citations. McCormick, “Judges and Journals,” supra note 58.
94. Benjamin RD Alarie & Andrew J Green, “Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Accuracy, Affiliation, and Acceptance” (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall LJ 381.
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3. What is the impact of law clerks in easing lower levels of fluency 
in the other official language? In other words, do we see a different 
pattern of decision-making when judges have more bilingual law 
clerks? What is the optimal number of bilingual law clerks above 
which adding one more bilingual clerk does not make any difference 
in the outcome? Has the overall level of bilingualism of the Court 
increased over time?
4. What is the impact of lower levels of assertiveness on actual 
outcomes? If unilingual judges are less assertive in francophone 
cases, they will be more likely to cast a vote that differs from 
their preferred outcome. It would be interesting to measure the 
difference between their average liberal voting score for federal law 
cases coming before them in English as compared to those coming 
before them in French and to see if there is a difference. Do these 
differences reflect the leadership of their Quebec or bilingual 
colleagues? Does the linguistic composition of the Court influence 
its median voter?
5. What is the impact of language proficiency in other multilingual 
jurisdictions? Do the patterns identified here are the same in other 
institutional contexts and what mechanisms can alleviate the 
differences between unilingual and multilingual judges?
On a final note, we hope that this positive discussion will make future 
normative debates about the requirement of mandatory bilingualism at the 
Supreme Court of Canada more empirically informed.
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V. APPENDIX A
Judges Category Reason
Cartwright Bilingual  (From Qc) Writer’s assessment
Fauteux Bilingual(From Qc) Bilingual teaching experience (McGill and Ottawa)
Abbott Bilingual (From Qc)
Bilingual Education (McGill and Dijon) and 
presumption of bilingualism (from Quebec)
Martland Unknown Not enough information
Judson Bilingual Writer’s assessment
Ritchie Unknown Not enough information
Hall Bilingual English and French education (Sask) and French work experience (SCC site, taught French)
Spence Unknown Not enough information
Pigeon Bilingual(From Qc) Writer’s assessment
Laskin Unknown Media coverage
Dickson Unilingual Biographer’s assessment
Beetz Bilingual(From Qc) Bilingual Education (UdeM and Oxford)
de Grandpré Bilingual  (From Qc) Bilingual Education (McGill and Collège St-Marie)
Estey Unilingual Media coverage
Pratte Bilingual  (From Qc) Bilingual Education (Laval and UToronto)
McIntyre Unilingual Biographer’s assessment
Chouinard Bilingual Bilingual Education (Laval and Oxford)
Lamer Bilingual  (From Qc) Presumption of bilingualism (from Quebec)
Wilson Unilingual Biographer’s assessment
Le Dain Bilingual Bilingual education and teaching experience
La Forest Bilingual Media coverage and biographer’s assessment
L’Heureux-Dubé Bilingual  (From Qc) Presumption of bilingualism (from Quebec)
Sopinka Unilingual Media coverage
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Gonthier Bilingual  (From Qc) Bilingual Education (Collège Stanislas and McGill)
Cory Bilingual Writer’s assessment
McLachlin Bilingual Writer’s assessment
Stevenson Unilingual Writer’s assessment
Iacobucci Bilingual Media coverage
Major Unilingual Writer’s assessment and media coverage
Bastarache Bilingual Bilingual Education and Teaching (UdeM and UOttawa)
Binnie Bilingual Media coverage
Arbour Bilingual Bilingual education and teaching experience (UdeM education and Osgoode Hall teaching)
LeBel Bilingual  (From Qc) Bilingual Education (ULaval and UToronto)
Deschamps Bilingual  (From Qc) Bilingual Education (UdeM and McGill)
Fish Bilingual(From Qc) Bilingual Education (Mcgill and Paris)
Abella Bilingual Media coverage
Charron Bilingual Bilingual education and teaching experience (Carleton Education, Ottawa French teaching)
Rothstein Unilingual
Media coverage and personal testimony during the 
hearings before the Ad Hoc Committee to Review a 
Nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada
Cromwell Bilingual Media coverage
Moldaver Unilingual
Media coverage and personal testimony during 
the hearings before the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Appointment of Supreme Court of Canada Justices
Karakatsanis Bilingual
Media coverage and personal testimony during 
the hearings before the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Appointment of Supreme Court of Canada Justices
Wagner Bilingual(From Qc) Presumption of bilingualism (from Quebec)
